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WHY TIE AIRLINE FARES TO SUBSIDIZED
RAILROAD PASSENGER RATES?
By Roy R. ROADCAP
Author and Publisher of World Airline Record; Member, Cole,
Roadcap & Associates, financial research consultants, Chicago.
Formerly, analyst with various investm ent banking firms. North-
western University, B.S., 1942.
W HEN U. S. commercial air transport had its humble beginning
back in 1926, the chief concern of the operators was flying the
mail. Ultimately, it was thought, passenger planes would link our
major cities, but it was not until Congress passed the Watres Act of
1930 that regular passenger service received its real impetus. For the
first time it was recognized that carrying passengers could lower the
cost of mail service. The Watres Act provided "bonuses" to mail con-
tractors for acquiring aircraft which could accommodate both mail and
passengers. With this ,incentive passenger service began to be pushed
more aggressively. In 1930 air fares averaged a little over eight cents
a mile compared with ten to twelve cents or more previously.
AIR FARES LIMITED BY RAILROAD FARES
Gradually it came to be recognized that to develop any appreciable
volume of passenger traffic, rates would have to bear some reasonable
relationship to railroad passenger fares. Of necessity, therefore, the
upper limit of air fares was largely determined by railroad competition.
Thus first class rail fares (including Pullman charges) plus some
allowance for speed and novelty became the effective ceiling on airline
passenger fares.
Although such rates were obviously insufficient to support passenger
service independently, they did achieve one of the primary objectives
of the Watres Act by reducing the cost of the airmail service to the
government. Except for relatively small ups and downs this cost has
declined steadily. The rapid growth of air travel which followed has
frequently obscured this basic purpose for which our commercial air
transport system was founded, namely, to fly the mail.
Without such a historical perspective many have been led to believe
that "the cart came before the horse" or, in other words, that airmail
payments to the carriers were devised just to make passenger service
possible. Thus the easy conclusion follows that such service is subsi-
dized. To the extent that one economic activity tends to support an-
other, there may be an element of "subsidy" in such a relationship.
Perhaps the day has arrived when public policy should dictate that
air passenger service support airmail. If so, the priority which airmail
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now enjoys over any other type of air service would give way to the
"when, as, and if" basis assigned to air freight. Such a system would
be inconsistent with all previous concepts of expediting the mail.
Moreover, it would be incongrous to expect the airlines to haul the
mail at a rate applicable to that of the lowest commodity classification
when other transport'agencies charge the government up to ten times
as much for mail as for many classes of freight. Recent studies have
shown that rates paid the airlines for carrying six-cent air mail are
closely comparable to that paid the railroads for carrying three-cent
mail.
To say that development of our air passenger service to its present
high state has not been assisted in some measure through early mail
payments would be a gross error indeed. However, to those who have
contended that it is heavily subsidized, the question might fairly be
asked as to what it would cost to maintain and operate a fleet whose
sole purpose was to fly the mail. Even the most conservative cost esti-
mate for a service resembling present standards would undoubtedly
be several times total mail payments to the domestic trunk lines.
QUESTION POSED BY SUBSIDIZED RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE
But regardless of the pros and cons of these and other points, there
is one very significant factor which deserves serious examination in
any consideration of "subsidy." This concerns the general subject of
competing transport fares. It has been shown that air passenger fares
have been historically related to those of first class rail service in that
generally air fares equalled first class and Pullman charges plus a
premium for speed and novelty. Inasmuch as maintenance of this
relationship initially had a obvious bearing on traffic generation, the
question might be raised as to the derivation and adequacy of railroad
fares. Here our concern is primarily with adequacy. If, for example,
rail fares are artificially low it would seem to indicate that perhaps
airline fares are, of necessity, kept lower than would otherwise be the
case. To what extent is this true?
Examination of the record clearly shows that passenger train serv-
ice, in most cases, is unprofitable. It is fairly well known that most
suburban commuter service is conducted at a loss, yet it is seldom
recognized that on intercity passenger service most railroads operate
at a deficit or else barely break even. Despite retroactive mail pay
increases last year, not a single railroad showed a profit in its passenger
division. In fact, passenger train operating ratios ranged from just
under 100% (before rents, fixed charges, etc.) to as high as 192%.
For all class one roads the average was 124%.
As the following table indicates, this condition was not peculiar
to 1950. It has been true for many years with but a few exceptions,
such as the heavy troop and civilian movements during World War II
which were fairly profitable.
AIRLINE FARES
Although there appeared to be some improvement in 1950 it should
be noted that last year's loss of $509,000,000 had been reduced by
$107,000,000 of mail pay awarded in December but which was ap-
plicable to the years 1947, 1948, 1949. Otherwise the loss amounted
to a near record of $616,000,000.
How have the railroads been able to withstand losses of such mag-
nitude? Evidently freight service has absorbed the loss. Last year net
operating income from freight trains amounted to $1,547,000,000.
After absorbing the adjusted $616,000,000 deficit incurred in passen-
ger train service, net earnings before fixed charges, etc. were reduced
to $931,000,000. Deducting such charges, the return on net investment
amounted to 3.8%. The trend over the last fifteen years has been as
follows:
TABLE I
PASSENGER TRAFFIC, REVENUE-AND OPERATING INCOME-
CLASS I RAILROADS
Revenue (a) Net Operating
Passenger Passenger Revenue
Miles Revenue Passenger Division
(billions) (millions) (millions)
1936 22.4 $ 412 d $233
1937 24.7 443 d 242
1938 21.6 406 d 255
1939 22.7 417 d 251
1940 23.8 417 d 262
1941 29.4 515 d 226
1942 53.7 1,028 89
1943 87.8 1,653 280
1944 95.5 1,790 234
1945 91.7 1,716 230
1946 64.7 1,259 d 140
1947 45.9 963 d 427
1948 41.2 964 d 560
1949 35.1 861 d 649
1950 31.8 813 d 509
(d) Deficit. (a) Excluding sleeping accommodation charges received by
Pullman Company. Source: Association of American Railroads.
In this table the data has been taken from reports of the Association
of American Railroads. It reflects the long-accepted accounting sys-
tem prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Some have
argued that this system does not present a true picture because of the
basis of allocating joint costs. It is contended that passenger train
deficits are not cash losses. Actually, this is true to only a very limited
extent since nearly 75% of expenses charged to passenger trains are
direct costs. The other 25% represents the passenger portion of ex-
penses common to both passenger and freight services.
Thus, if all passenger trains had been discontinued last year, the
adjusted $616,000,000 loss absorbed by freight service profits would
not have disappeared automatically. A portion of overhead and fixed
charges were incurred on behalf of the passenger service but these
would continue whether passenger trains were operated or not. Re-
gardless of how fine a distinction is made over allocation of joint
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expenses, it is clear that passenger train service represents a substantial
financial drain. Whichever way the "cake is cut" the results are the
same - a relatively low rate of earnings on investment. Table II, which
also presents data taken from reports of the Association of American
Railroads, shows that this return over the last four years averaged less
than 3.8%. By all known regulatory standards, such a rate of return
is inadequate.
TABLE II
NET OPERATING INCOME AND RATE OF RETURN-
CLASS I RAILROADS
Net Railway Operating Income
Freight Passenger
Division Division Total Rate of
(millions) (millions) (millions) Return
1936 $ 892 d$ 233 $ 667 2.88%
1937 827 d 242 590 2.56
1938 626 d 255 373 1.62
1939 838 d 251 589 2.55
1940 943 d 262 682 2.93
1941 1,223 d 226 998 4.28
1942 1,394 89 1,485 6.30
1943 1,080 280 1,360 5.71
1944 871 234 1,106 4.71
1945 621 230 852 3.77
1946 760 d 140 620 2.75
1947 1,206 d 427 781 3.41
1948 1,561 d 560 1,002 4.24
1949 1,335 d 649 687 2.86
1950 1,548 d 509 1,040 3.99
(d) Deficit. Source: Association of American Railroads.
IMPACT ON AIRLINES
The implications of artificially low railroad fares now become
apparent. RAILROAD PASSENGER SERVICE IS VERY LARGELY SUBSIDIZED
By FREIGHT. To the domestic airlines this means that for a long time
air travel, with its fares based on rail fares, has also been under-priced.
It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that more realistic pricing of
rail passenger service undoubtedly would have made possible a health-
ier basis for the fare structure of the airlines. Thus, despite the his-
torical fact that the nation's commercial airlines initially were organized
to fly the mail, air passenger service would have been able to achieve
greater independence from whatever government assistance it received
before now.
To illustrate the importance of under-priced rail fares, Table III
shows the increases required merely to allow the railroads to break
even on passenger service. In 1950, for example, had average passen-
ger fares been about 63% higher there would have been little, if any,
drain on earnings from freight operations. Instead of earning an
inadequate 3.8 % return, earnings on net investment thereby would
have become a respectable 6.4%.
AIRLINE FARES
TABLE III




Per Rev. Needed to Actual Relative
Pass. Mile Break Even Increase Increase
1936 1.84c 2.88c 1.04c 56.5%
1937 1.79 2.77 0.98 54.7
1938 1.87 3.06 1.18 62.8
1939 1.84 2.95 1.11 60.3
1940 1.75 2.85 1.10 62.9
1941 1.75 2.52 0.77 44.0
1942 1.92 1.75 0.17* 8.9*
1943 1.88 1.56 0.32* 17.0*
1944 1.87 1.62 0.25* 13.3*
1945 1.87 1.62 0.25* 13.3*
1946 1.95 2.17 0.22 11.3
1947 2.10 3.03 0.93 44.3
1948 2.34 3.70 1.36 58.1
1949 2.45 4.30 1.85 75.5
1950 2.56 4.16 1.60 62.5
*Decrease
The full impact of more realistic pricing of rail passenger service
is clear. Table IV shows that the airlines would have benefited sub-
stantially from being ble to obtain a better basis for their fare struc-
ture. This table indicates that for some time now, had the airlines
raised their fares by an amount equal only to the actual dollars and
cents increase needed by the railroads merely to break even, airline
earnings would have been enlarged sufficiently to permit a good profit
with lower mail pay or even without any whatsoever.
TABLE IV
PASSENGER TRAFFIC, ACTUAL AND ADJUSTED REVENUES AND
AIRMAIL PAYMENTS 16 DOMESTIC AIRLINES
(Col. C) Additional(Col. B) Col.BAdjust'd Annual Total
Revenue Average To Reflect Pass. Rev. Domestic
Passenger Revenue Actualincreas At Rates Airmail
Miles Per Rev. In Rail Fares In Col. C Payments
(billions) Pass. Mile (PerTableIII) (millions) (millions)
1936 0.37 5.70c 6.74c $ 4 $12t
1937 0.41 5.60 6.58 4 14t
1938 0.48 5.18 6.36 6 16
1939 0.68 5.10 6.21 7 18
1940 1.05 5.07 6.17 12 20
1941 1.38 5.04 5.81 11 23
1942 -1.42 5.28 5.11 5* 23
1943 1.63 5.27 4.95 4* 24
1944 2.18 5.35 5.10 5* 33
1945 3.36 4.95 4.70 8* 34
1946 5.90 4.63 4.85 13 21
1947 6.01 5.06 5.99 56 29
1948 5.82 5.76 7.12 79 48
1949 6.56 5.76 7.61 121 45
1950 7.87 5.50 7.10 125 46
*Decrease. tFiscal years.
Except for the 1942-1945 period, an increase in air fares by only
the additional amount required to produce break-even rail fares would
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have augmented airline revenues substantially. In the earlier years
mail payments would have been cut sharply. After World War II the
larger revenues were more than double airmail payments on the
average.
If air fares had been increased by the same percentage or relative
amount required by the railroads to break even,'the results would be
even more startling. Using 1936 as an example, the actual increase of
1.04c amounted to 56.5% of the average rail passenger mile yield.
A similar percentage increase to maintain the same relative ratio would
have produced an average air fare equal to 8.90c instead of the 5.70c
received. The annual increment would amount to approximately
$12,000,000 as against only $4,000,000 at the 6.74c rate. The additional
revenues exactly equalled total airmail payments. Thus, it can be
concluded that our domestic airline service as early as 1936 could have
supported itself and carried all the airmail for nothing. Even at today's
low compensatory service rates of 45c per mail ton mile, the carriers
would have been paid nearly $2,500,000 in 1936.
